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There has been a major shift in research on human reasoning toward Bayesian and
probabilistic approaches, which has been called a new paradigm. The new paradigm sees
most everyday and scientific reasoning as taking place in a context of uncertainty, and
inference is from uncertain beliefs and not from arbitrary assumptions. In this manuscript
we present an empirical test of normative standards in the new paradigm using a novel
probabilized conditional reasoning task. Our results indicated that for everyday conditional
with at least a weak causal connection between antecedent and consequent only the
conditional probability of the consequent given antecedent contributes unique variance
to predicting the probability of conditional, but not the probability of the conjunction, nor
the probability of the material conditional. Regarding normative accounts of reasoning,
we found significant evidence that participants’ responses were confidence preserving
(i.e., p-valid in the sense of Adams 1998) for MP inferences, but not for MT inferences.
Additionally, only for MP inferences and to a lesser degree for DA inferences did the
rate of responses inside the coherence intervals defined by mental probability logic
(Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2005, 2010) exceed chance levels. In contrast to the normative
accounts, the dual-source model (Klauer et al., 2010) is a descriptive model. It posits that
participants integrate their background knowledge (i.e., the type of information primary
to the normative approaches) and their subjective probability that a conclusion is seen as
warranted based on its logical form. Model fits showed that the dual-source model, which
employed participants’ responses to a deductive task with abstract contents to estimate
the form-based component, provided as good an account of the data as a model that solely
used data from the probabilized conditional reasoning task.
Keywords: conditional reasoning, probabilistic reasoning, new paradigm psychology of reasoning, dual-source
model, coherence, p-validity, rationality, mixed models
INTRODUCTION
The most influential work in the psychology of conditional rea-
soning long presupposed as its normative standard the binary and
extensional logic of the propositional calculus (Johnson-Laird
and Byrne, 1991 see especially pp. 7 and 74). In this logical system,
a conditional “if p then q” is the material, truth functional con-
ditional, which is logically equivalent to “not-p or q.” There are,
however, many problems with holding that the natural language
conditionals that people reason with are equivalent to material
conditionals (Evans and Over, 2004). Prominent among these
problems are the “paradoxes” of the material conditional. For
example, it is logically valid to infer a material conditional, equiv-
alent to “not-p or q,” from “not-p,” and so the probability of such
a conditional will increase as the probability of “not-p” increases.
But consider a conditional about a coin we know to be fair, “If we
spin the coin 100 times then we will get 100 heads.” It would be
absurd if our subjective probability for this conditional increased
to ever higher levels as it became more and more likely that we
would not go to the trouble of spinning the coin that many times.
Another limitation of this binary and extensional paradigm
was that participants were asked in experiments on reasoning to
assume that the premises were true and to give binary responses
about what did, or did not, necessarily follow. In contrast, most
human reasoning, in everyday affairs and science, is from uncer-
tain premises, from more or less confidently held beliefs and
statements or claims made by other people. The conclusions
drawn are also more or less subjectively probable. Dissatisfaction
with the traditional experiments has been a factor in the pro-
posal of a new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning (Over,
2009; Evans, 2012; Elqayam and Over, 2013). The aim of the new
paradigm is to move beyond experiments on abstract materials
and premises given as assumptions. Participants are asked to rea-
son in an everyday setting from content rich materials, and to
provide their responses on graded scale reflecting various degrees
of belief (see Rips, 2001; Singmann and Klauer, 2011, for an
empirical dissociation of both methods).
The proposed normative system for the new studies of condi-
tional reasoning is no longer the binary and extensional proposi-
tional calculus, but rather subjective probability theory that goes
back to de Finetti (1936, 1937) and Ramsey (1931). The rele-
vant normative standard is what de Finetti termed the logic of
probability and Ramsey the logic of partial belief, as developed
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by Adams (1998), Gilio (2002), Gilio and Over (2012), and oth-
ers. The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning can also
be seen as part of the great impact Bayesian approaches have had
generally in cognitive science (Oaksford and Chater, 1994, 2001,
2007; Oaksford et al., 2000). Evans and Over (2004), Pfeifer and
Kleiter (2005, 2010), and Oaksford and Chater (2007) have pro-
posed accounts of human conditional reasoning that are central
examples of the new paradigm.
Much research in the old paradigm dealt with so-called basic
conditionals, which are defined to be indicative conditionals with
an abstract content (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002). People can-
not use background knowledge and context to help them evaluate
basic conditionals. Such conditionals are not very similar to the
knowledge and context laden conditionals of ordinary and scien-
tific reasoning. Realistic indicative conditionals, of the latter type,
can be classified in a number of ways (Douven and Verbrugge,
2010), but here we are mainly concerned with conditionals that
are justified by some sort of (at least weak) causal connection
between the antecedent and consequent (Over et al., 2007). For
lack of a better term, we call these conditionals everyday condi-
tionals. Our interest in these conditionals stems from the fact that
people use subjective probability judgments based on knowledge
of content and context to evaluate them.
The new paradigm gives a new interpretation to such everyday
conditionals. It does not see them as material conditionals, the
probability of which is the same as that the probability of “¬p or
q,” P(¬p ∨ q), (where ¬p is “not-p”). In the new paradigm, the
probability of one of these conditionals, P(if p then q), is the con-
ditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent, P(q|p).
The relation, P(if p then q) = P(q|p), is so important that it is
simply called the Equation (Edgington, 1995) in analytical philos-
ophy (or conditional probability hypothesis in psychology) .1 Based
on the Equation probabilistic accounts of human conditional rea-
soning were developed (Oaksford and Chater, 2007; Pfeifer and
Kleiter, 2010). Moreover, if the Equation holds, the “paradoxes”
of the material conditional we referred to above cannot be derived
(Pfeifer, 2014; see Pfeifer, 2013, for an empirical study of the
“paradoxes”). For example, it will no longer hold that the proba-
bility of the above example conditional, about spinning the coin
100 times, increases as we becomemore andmore determined not
to spin it thatmany times. The conditional probability that we will
get 100 heads given that we spin the coin 100 times is extremely
low, and will stay low as it gets more and more likely we will not
spin the coin.
Another hypothesis for the probability of everyday condition-
als concerns those justified by reference to causal relations. If
such conditionals state the existence of a causal relation, then
the presence of the antecedent should raise the probability of the
consequent compared to when the antecedent is absent. In other
words, whereas the conditional probability P(q|p) should be posi-
tively related with the probability of a conditional, the conditional
1Note that Lewis’ famous triviality arguments (Lewis, 1976) which apparently
show that the Equation is untenable on theoretical grounds, actually depend
on an interpretation of conditionals that is empirically not supported. See
Douven and Verbrugge (2013) for an extensive discussion and experimental
results conclusively showing that Lewis’ arguments do not apply.
probability of alternatives to the conditional (i.e., not p cases
leading to q), P(q|¬p) should be negatively related with the prob-
ability of a conditional. This inequality (P(q|p) − P(q|¬p) > 0) is
also known as the delta-p rule (Allan, 1980; Sloman, 2005).
A multitude of studies has shown that the conditional proba-
bility P(q|p) and to a lesser extent the conjunction P(p ∧ q) are
predictors for the probability of the conditional (Evans et al.,
2003; Oberauer and Wilhelm, 2003; Oberauer et al., 2007; Over
et al., 2007; Douven and Verbrugge, 2010, 2013; Politzer et al.,
2010; Fugard et al., 2011). A first goal of the current manuscript
is to further advance these previous studies by adopting some
procedural variations which more strongly capture the central
notions of the new paradigm, everyday reasoning and subjective
probabilities. Specifically, some of the studies (Evans et al., 2003;
Oberauer et al., 2007; Fugard et al., 2011) have, using the proba-
bilistic truth table task, provided participants with the frequencies
constituting the joint probability distribution over antecedent
and consequent for a given basic conditional. From this proba-
bility distribution the probabilities corresponding to the different
hypotheses for the probability of the given conditional could
be construed and compared with individuals’ estimates of the
probability of said conditional. The probabilities used were par-
ticularly easy to grasp (see especially Politzer et al., 2010), but
perceptions of probabilities can be biased (e.g., Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992). In some studies the conditional probability
P(q|p) is not reported directly by participants but calculated from
their estimates of the unconditional probabilities constituting the
joint probability distribution over antecedent and consequent
(Over et al., 2007). As conditional probability is seen as primi-
tive by some proponents of the new paradigm (and not defined
over unconditional probabilities but given by people’s use of the
Ramsey test - see Evans and Over, 2004; Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2005)
it may seem preferable to work with it as a primitive probability.
Finally, we think it is important to show the relationship on an
individual level (cf. Douven and Verbrugge, 2010, 2013). Hence,
we assess the conditional probability hypothesis with everyday
conditionals and assess the probabilities corresponding to the
different competing hypotheses directly and independently.
In addition to the question on how individuals understand
the conditional, the new paradigm also offers new ideas on how
individuals reason from conditional inferences. The conditional
inferences usually studied consist of the conditional as the major
premise, a categorical minor premise, and a putative conclusion:
• Modus Ponens (MP): If p then q. p. Therefore q.
• Modus Tollens (MT): If p then q. Not q. Therefore not p.
• Affirmation of the Consequent (AC): If p then q. q. Therefore p.
• Denial of the Antecedent (DA): If p then q. Not p. Therefore
not q.
In the next paragraphs we present major accounts for explain-
ing reasoning from those conditional inferences within the new
paradigm.
NORMATIVE ACCOUNTS
According to classical logic MP and MT are valid (i.e., truth
preserving) inferences: the truth of the two premises necessarily
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entails the truth of the consequence. Likewise AC and DA are not
valid, so the truth of the conclusion does not necessarily follow
from true premises (i.e., drawing an AC or DA inference is consid-
ered a reasoning fallacy). But the new paradigm focuses generally
on degrees of belief in premises. A normative view that builds
upon degrees of belief is given by Adams’ (1998) probability logic
with the notion of probabilistic validity or p-validity, according to
which inferences should be confidence preserving: a p-valid con-
clusion cannot be more uncertain than the premises on which
it is based. Formally, uncertainty of an event p is defined as the
complement of the probability of p, U(p) = 1 − P(p), and for p-
valid inferences the uncertainty of the conclusion cannot exceed
the sum of the uncertainties of the premises whatever the proba-
bilities of the premises and conclusion. Parallel to classical logic,
MP and MT are p-valid and AC and DA are not p-valid. Hence
another goal of the current manuscript is to provide a test of p-
validity as a computational level account (in Marr’s, 1982, sense)
of human reasoning.
A stronger normative framework is proposed by Pfeifer and
Kleiter’s (2005; 2010) mental probability logic, as it derives prob-
abilistically informative restrictions for all four inferences, MP,
MT, AC, and DA. In contrast to Adams’ (1998) notion that valid
inferences are confidence preserving, they propose that reasoners’
inferences should be probabilistically coherent (see de de Finetti,
1936; Coletti and Scozzafava, 2002; Gilio, 2002). Coherence here
means that reasoners, when asked to estimate the probability of an
event that stands in a relationship with other events for which the
probabilities are known or estimated (e.g., the conclusion derived
from a set of premises), should make an estimate that does not
expose them to a Dutch book (i.e., that is coherent with the other
probabilities according to coherence-based probability logic; see
Pfeifer, 2014, for the relation to standard probability theory).
Furthermore, in case not all probabilities necessary to calculate a
point estimate for the desired event are available, the estimated
probability should fall in the interval that is derived when the
missing probabilities are allowed to range between 0 and 1. For
example, in the case of MP, the two premises are (a) the condi-
tional statement if p then q with probability P(q|p) and (b) the
minor premise p with probability P(p) and the to be estimated
probability is P(q), for the conclusion q. According to the law of
total probability the desired probability is given by:
MP: P(q) = P(q|p)P(p) + P(q|¬p) (1 − P(p)) (1)
Note that we have exchanged the probability P(¬p) with its com-
plement 1 − P(p) with the consequence that of the four terms
on the right side, three are already present in the premises. The
product of the premises is the first summand, P(q|p)P(p), and
the complement of the minor premise, 1 − P(p) is present in
the second summand. Only the probability of alternatives to the
conditional, P(q|¬p) (i.e., non-p cases in which the consequent
holds), is less salient given that none of the premises concerns
this probability. Assuming that P(q|¬p) can range from 0 to 1, we
can substitute it with either 0 or 1 which gives us the coherence
interval for MP:
MP: P(q) = [P(q|p)P(p), P(q|p)P(p) + (1 − P(p))] .
Pfeifer and Kleiter (2005; see also Wagner, 2004; Pfeifer
and Kleiter, 2006) provide analogous intervals for the other
inferences:
MT: P(¬p) =
[
max
(
1 − P(q|p) − P(¬q)
1 − P(q|p) ,
P(q|p) + P(¬q) − 1
P(q|p)
)
, 1
]
AC: P(p) =
[
0,min
(
P(q)
P(q|p) ,
1 − P(q)
1 − P(q|p)
)]
DA: P(¬q) = [1 − P(¬p) − P(q|p)(1 − P(¬p)),
1 − P(q|p)(1 − P(¬p))]
One goal of the current manuscript is to test mental probability
logic as a computational levels account of reasoning, by assess-
ing whether or not participants responses fall in the intervals
predicted by mental probability logic.
Another normative account of conditional reasoning stems
from the proponents of Bayesian rationality, Oaksford and Chater
(2007, chapter 5; Oaksford et al., 2000). Their probabilistic
approach is couched within the same philosophical tradition as
the aforementioned ones and also uses elementary probability
theory to derive predictions but differs in one important aspect.
It assumes that the presence of the minor premise sets the corre-
sponding probability to one [e.g., P(p) = 1 forMP]. The assumed
inferential step to derive an estimate of the conclusion is to condi-
tionalize on the minor premise, the probability of the conclusion
should equal the conditional probability of the conclusion given
minor premise. For example for MP, the probability of the con-
clusion should equal the probability of the conditional, P(q|p).
Oaksford and Chater provided formulas to obtain point estimates
for all four inferences. However, in the study reported in this
manuscript we employed an experimental method in which the
subjective probability of the minor premise need not equal 1.
Therefore, we do not test the empirical adequacy of Oaksford and
Chater’s account as a computational level theory of reasoning.
We follow Pfeifer and Kleiter (2006; 2007; 2009; 2010) and Evans
et al. (2014) in studying whether people conform to p-validity and
coherence in their conditional inferences when both premises are
uncertain.
THE DUAL-SOURCE MODEL
A formal model for a descriptive account for probabilistic reason-
ing was proposed by Klauer et al. (2010), the dual-source model.
It assumes that individuals integrate two different types of infor-
mation (i.e., sources) when making an inference, background
knowledge regarding the subject matter and information regard-
ing the logical form of the inference. The background knowledge
reflects individuals’ subjective probability with which the conclu-
sion follows from the premises given the individuals’ knowledge
about them. This part of the model is tied to the normative
approaches presented so far in that the model assumes that for
conditional inferences this probability is derived from a coher-
ent probability distribution over p, q, and their complements. In
fact, the published studies employing the dual-source model used
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the formulas by Oaksford et al. (2000) to estimate the knowledge
based component.
The theoretical expansion to the probabilistic approaches pre-
sented so far is the form-based component. It reflects individuals
subjective probability with which an inference is warranted by the
logical form (e.g., “How likely is the conclusion given that the
inference is MP?”). The introduction of this part of the model
was in part motivated by empirical findings that participants
give higher estimate to a conclusion q when in addition to the
minor premise p the conditional “if p then q” is also present
(Liu, 2003). In other words, only conditionalizing on the minor
premise, as proposed by Oaksford et al. (2000), does not seem
to capture the complete data pattern. It should be noted that
the form-based component is a subjective probability reflecting
participants’ belief in the logicality of logical forms and thereby
not directly related to the actual logical status. To come to a
blended reasoning conclusion the knowledge-based information,
represented by parameter ξ , and the form-based information,
represented by parameter τ , are integrated by the weighting
parameter λ using Bayesian model averaging. The prediction of
the dual-source model for a conditional C and inference x is
given by
λ{τ (x) + (1 − τ (x)) × ξ(C, x)} + (1 − λ)ξ(C, x) (2)
Note that in this formula, the knowledge parameters ξ(C, x)
enters the model in two places: in the knowledge-based com-
ponent [the second summand which is weigthed with (1 − λ)],
but also in the form-based part (weighted with λ). The rationale
for the latter is that it is assumed that individuals, in cases when
they are unsure of whether or not a conclusion is warranted by
the logical form of the inference (i.e., in (1 − τ (x)) cases), resort
to their background knowledge, ξ(C, x), as a fall-back position.
One goal of the present manuscript is to apply the dual-source
model in an experimental setup that strongly diverges from the
experiments reported by Klauer et al. (2010), thereby providing
convergent evidence for its usefulness. Furthermore, we use (a)
a different formula to estimate the knowledge-based component
which is based on the ideas of mental probability theory and uses
no free parameters and (b) use a novel way to estimate the form-
based component of the model which also does not rely on free
parameters.
THE PRESENT EXPERIMENT
For an empirical test of the empirical adequacy of the approaches
presented above it is necessary to obtain not only participants’
responses to the conditional inferences, but also estimates of
the probability of the premises and estimates of the hypothe-
sized predictors for the probability of the conditional. Therefore,
participants provided the probabilities necessary to test the afore-
mentioned approaches in addition to estimating the probability
of the conditional inferences. In this novel probabilized conditional
inference task, participants were first asked for the probability of
the conditional and then for the probability of the minor premise.
Next we presented the conditional inference: the conditional and
minor premise were presented together with participants’ prob-
ability estimates for the premises. Participants were asked to
estimate how likely the conclusion is given the information pre-
sented. After this, we asked for the remaining probabilities we
were interested in for this specific content, such as the condi-
tional probability P(q|p) or the probability of alternatives to the
conditional, P(q|¬p). To use this order invariantly, participants
only worked on one inference for each conditional. In line with
our goal to assess everyday reasoning we only used highly believ-
able conditionals, as reasoning from unbelievable conditionals
seems somewhat unnatural. To obtain estimates of participants’
form-based components of the dual-source model participants
performed a second task afterwards. They worked on a deduc-
tive conditional inference task with abstract materials and strong
deductive instructions (see Singmann and Klauer, 2011).
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty participants (mean age= 22.4 years, SD = 2.9, range from
18 to 30 years) participated in this experiment which was the
second session in a larger study on reasoning addressing other
hypotheses with other materials. In the previous session partic-
ipants had worked on a conditional inference task with prob-
abilistic instructions. More specifically, in the previous session
participants were asked to provide estimates for the probability
of the conclusions of all four conditional inferences (plus for the
four so-called converse inferences; Oaksford et al., 2000) for six
different conditionals three of which were uttered by an expert
and three by a non–expert (i.e., analogous to Stevenson and Over,
2001). Sessions were separated by at least 1 week. Most par-
ticipants were students of the University of Freiburg (28) with
differing majors, excluding majors with an education in logic
such as math, physics or psychology. Participants received 14e
compensation after the third session.
MATERIALS
All materials were presented in German, participants’ mother
tongue. For the probabilized conditional reasoning task we
adapted 13 believable conditionals from Evans et al. (2010) and
added three similar conditionals (which were not pretested) such
as “If Greece leaves the Euro then Italy will too.” The full list of
conditionals can be found in the Supplemental material. Each
participant worked on four randomly selected conditionals of
the total of 16 conditionals and performed only one inference
(i.e., MP, MT, AC, or DA) per conditional. More details are given
below. In the instructions it was clarified that the conditionals
were related to events that might occur within the next ten years
in Germany or the rest of the world.
For the deductive conditional inference task we used two con-
ditionals about a hypothetical letter number pair: “If the letter is
a B then the number is a 7.” and “If the number is a 4 then the
letter is an E”. Participants performed all four inferences for both
conditionals.
PROCEDURE
Probabilized conditional inference task
In the first part of the experiment, participants were instructed
to estimate probabilities of events or statements or to estimate
the probability of a conclusion following an argument, “as if
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they were in a discussion regarding these issues.” Four condition-
als were randomly selected for each participant and randomly
assigned to the four inferences. For each conditional/inference
participants responded to eight items which were presented in
one block (i.e., participant first responded to all eight items for
the conditional that was randomly selected for e.g., MP, before
working on the eight items for the conditional that was randomly
selected for e.g., MT). As participants only worked on exactly one
conditional for each inference, participants worked on four blocks
of eight items in total (i.e., 32 items overall in the probabilized
conditional inference task) and the order of blocks was also ran-
domized anew for each participant. For each item, the response
was given on a scale from 0 to 100%. In contrast to the work of
Pfeifer and Kleiter (e.g., 2007, 2010), who asked participants to
provide either point estimates or interval estimates, participants
in our experiments always had to provide point estimates, even
for the conditional inference [type (b) below]. The responses were
transformed to a probability scale (i.e., divided by 100) prior to
the analysis. Each item appeared on its own screen.
Within each block, participants responded to three different
types of items: (a) first participants gave estimates for the prob-
ability of the premises, (b) then participants had to estimate the
conclusion of the conditional inference, and (c) finally participants
had to estimate the other probabilities we were interested in. The
three different types of items were always presented in that order.
In the following we present one example for each of the eight
items using the conditional “If Greece leaves the Euro then Italy
will too”, assuming it was randomly selected for the MP inference.
For items of type (a) (probability of the premises), participants
first estimated the probability of the conditional, P(if p then q),
and then the probability of the minor premise, P(p).
If Greece leaves the Euro then Italy will too.
In your opinion, how probable is the above state-
ment/assertion [Aussage]?
Greece will leave the Euro.
In your opinion, how probable is it that the above event
occurs [dass die obige Aussage eintritt]?
There was only one item of type (b): Participants had to give
an estimate of the probability of the conclusion following the
conditional inference. They, were again presented the condi-
tional and the minor premise along with the probability estimates
participants had just given (represented by xx):
If Greece leaves the Euro then Italy will too.
(Probability xx%)
Greece will leave the Euro.
(Probability xx%)
Under these premises, how probable is that Italy will leave
the Euro, too?
After this, the items of type (c) for the other probabilities we
were interested in were presented in a new random order for each
block and participant. For evaluating the conditional probabil-
ity hypothesis, we asked participants to estimate the conditional
probability P(q|p), the probability of the conjunction P(p ∧ q),
and the probability of the material conditional P(¬p ∨ q).
Furthermore we asked for the probability of alternatives, P(q|¬p),
and again for the probability of the event in the conclusion this
time without the premises (i.e., P(q) for MP, P(¬p) for MT, P(p)
for AC, and P(¬q) for DA; however, we do not report an analysis
of this estimate in the following):
P(q|p) :
How probable is that Italy will leave the Euro should Greece
leave the Euro?
P(p ∧ q):
Greece will leave the Euro and simultaneously Italy will leave
the Euro.
In your opinion, how probable is it that the above event
occurs?
P(¬p ∨ q):
Greece will NOT leave the Euro or Italy will leave the Euro.
In your opinion, how probable is it that the above event
occurs?
P(q|¬p):
How probable is that Italy will leave the Euro should Greece
NOT leave the Euro?
P(q):
Italy will leave the Euro.
In your opinion, how probable is it that the above event
occurs?
After working on all eight items for one combination of inference
and conditional, participants then worked on the next block of
eight items with a different combination of inference and con-
ditional. Note that in blocks for inferences other than MP, the
questions for the minor premise [type (a)] and the question for
the conclusion [type (b) and type (c), last item] were adapted
accordingly (but no other questions).
Deductive conditional inference task
Directly after the first task the second task started, which was
modeled after Singmann and Klauer’s (2011) deductive condi-
tion. Participants were instructed to judge the logical validity of
arguments: “Which conclusion follows with logical necessity from
a given argument?” The response had to be given on a scale from 0
to 100 (i.e., the same scale as in the probabilized task, but without
the %-character). For example:
If the number is a 4 then the letter is an E.
The number is a 4.
How valid is the conclusion that the letter is an E from a
logical perspective?
Participants were instructed to respond with 0 if the conclusion
did not necessarily follow from the premises and with 100 if the
conclusion did necessarily follow from the premises. Furthermore
they read: “When you are unsure, you can indicate the degree to
which you think the conclusion is valid by selecting a number
between 0 and 100.” Participants worked on all four inferences
for each of the two conditionals. Presentations of inferences was
random, blocked per conditionals, with the blocks also presented
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in random order. The responses were transformed to a probability
scale (i.e., divided by 100) prior to the analysis.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY HYPOTHESIS
The conditional probability hypothesis states that the proba-
bility of the conditional P(if p then q) is predicted by the con-
ditional probability P(q|p), whereas neither the probability of
the material conditional P(¬p ∨ q) nor the probability of the
conjunction P(p ∧ q) should contribute unique variance to this
prediction. According to the delta-p rule, the probability of
the conditional should also be negatively related to the prob-
ability of alternatives P(q|¬p). Table 1 displays the correlations
of these variables across all responses (i.e., item by participant
combinations). It can be seen that, as predicted, the condi-
tional probability P(q|p) and additionally the conjunction P(p ∧
q) are correlated with P(if p then q) but not the other vari-
ables. However, these results have to be interpreted cautiously as
responses were nested within participants (each participant gave
four responses) and within conditionals (for each conditional
we obtained between five and ten responses) which violates the
assumptions for standard correlation ormultiple regression (Judd
et al., 2012).
To overcome these problems, we estimated a linear mixed
model (LMM) for the probability of the conditional as depen-
dent variable with crossed random effects for participants and
conditional (Baayen et al., 2008) using lme4 (Bates et al.,
2013) for the statistical programming language R (R Core Team,
2013). We entered the four assumed predictors and inference
(MP, MT, AC, and DA) simultaneously as fixed effects and
estimated random intercepts for participants and items plus
random inference slopes and correlations among the random
inference slopes for the random item effect. This model real-
ized the maximal random effects structure recommended by Barr
et al. (Barr, 2013; Barr et al., 2013, the random inference slopes
for participants had only one observation for every level and
could therefore not be estimated reliably)2. A model with-
out the fixed and random effects for inference produced the
Table 1 | Correlations with the Probability of the Conditional
P(if p then q).
P(q|p) P(p ∧ q) P (¬p ∨ q) P (q|¬p) Mean SD
P(if p then q) 0.84* 0.61* 0.09 0.04 0.61 0.26
P(q|p) 0.72* 0.11 0.08 0.60 0.27
P(p ∧ q) 0.15 0.21 0.54 0.30
P(¬p ∨ q) 0.43* 0.42 0.25
P(q|¬p) 0.27 0.24
Significant correlations (p < 0.05) are printed in bold. Correlations that are also
significant after controlling for multiple testing using the Bonferroni-Holm correc-
tion are additionally marked with an asterisk. The two rightmost columns show
mean and SD of the variables.
2Throughout this manuscript whenever estimating random slopes we also
estimated the correlation between the slopes.
exact same pattern of significant and non–significant results. To
assess the significance of fixed effects in LMMs we obtained
the Kenward-Rogers approximation for degrees of freedom of
the full model compared with a model in which the effect of
interest was excluded throughout this manuscript with the meth-
ods implemented in afex (Singmann, 2013) and pbkrtest
(Halekoh and Højsgaard, 2013). The fixed effects are displayed
in Table 2 and were fully in line with the conditional prob-
ability hypothesis: when controlling for participant and item
effects and estimating all parameters simultaneously, only the
conditional probability P(q|p) was a significant predictor of the
probability of the conditional and none of the other variables.
In fact, for all other predictors the estimated parameters were
virtually 0.
In an exploratory analysis we estimated a second mixed model
in which we added all interactions of the predictors of interest
(after centering all predictors and the dependent variable on 0).
The random effects structure remained identical to the previous
model. In an additional exploratory analysis in which we excluded
the random and fixed effects for inference, the pattern of signifi-
cant and non–significant effects was the same as reported below.
The analysis revealed, in addition to the significant main effect of
P(q|p), a significant three-way interaction of P(q|p) with P(p ∧ q)
and P(¬p ∨ q), F(1, 72.74) = 4.09, p = 0.047 (the full results table
can be found in the Supplemental material). This interaction is
displayed in Figure 1, with the main predictor P(q|p) on the x-
axis and the dependent variable P(if p then q) on the y-axis, high
and low values of P(p ∧ q) are displayed as separate lines and high
and low values of P(¬p ∨ q) are displayed as separate plots (with
high and low values referring to values plus and minus one SD
from the mean, Cohen et al., 2002). The mean values are dis-
played as black lines and the individual estimates based on the
random participant intercepts are displayed as gray lines in the
background. Predictions were obtained by setting P(q|¬p) to 0,
aggregating across all four inferences, and then transforming the
predictions back on the probability scale. This interaction indi-
cated that for low values of P(¬p ∨ q), higher values for P(p ∧ q)
also meant higher values for P(if p then q), whereas for high
values of P(¬p ∨ q), P(p ∧ q) interacted with P(q|p) so that for
Table 2 | Main effects linear mixed model on the probability of the
conditional P(if p then q).
Effect Parameter F df F-scaling p
(Intercept) 0.14 8.70 1, 60.35 1 0.005
Inference 0.43 3, 10.16 0.84 0.74
P(q|p) 0.78 86.81 1, 88.14 1 <0.001
P(p ∧ q) 0.00 0.00 1, 90.91 1 >0.99
P(¬p ∨ q) −0.01 0.01 1, 88.26 1 0.91
P(q|¬p) −0.00 0.00 1, 81.59 1 0.98
The model was fitted with restricted maximum likelihood. Model df = 20,
AIC = −98.42, BIC = −42.67, deviance = −138.42, 20=0.84 (explained vari-
ance against the intercept only model; Xu, 2003). The values in the table note
are based on a model with variables centered on 0 to be comparable to the
Supplemental material.
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high values of P(q|p) lower values of P(p ∧ q) predicted higher
P(if p then q).
In summary, our data corroborated the conditional probabil-
ity hypothesis: in contrast to previous work (e.g., Over et al., 2007;
Fugard et al., 2011) only the conditional probability P(q|p) is a
significant predictor of the probability of the conditional. There
was no evidence in support of the other hypotheses. Although
we found an unexpected three-way interaction involving P(p ∧ q)
and P(¬p ∨ q), the interaction is not easy to interpret and with-
out proper replication we refrain from discussing it further. Our
second mixed model analysis revealed another interesting find-
ing: there does not seem to be any influence of alternatives to the
conditional P(q|¬p). If the delta-p rule influenced the subjective
probability of a conditional we would expect to find either a main
effect or an interaction of P(q|¬p) with P(q|p). As neither of those
appeared delta-p is not supported by our data.
p-VALIDITY
According to Adams (1998), the p-valid inferences MP and MT
are confidence preserving: the uncertainty of the conclusion
FIGURE 1 | The significant three-way interaction of P(q|p) × P(p ∧ q) ×
P(¬p ∨ q) on P(if p then q). Predictions based on the random participant
effects are shown in gray, and the mean effect in black. Detailed description
in the main text.
should not exceed the summed uncertainty of the premises, where
uncertainty is defined as U(p) = 1 − P(p). Figure 2 displays the
summed uncertainties of the premises on the x-axis against the
uncertainty of the conclusion on the y-axis, for the individual
responses to the four inferences (summed uncertainties larger
than 1 are truncated at 1). Values in the lower triangle of each
panel are consistent with p-validity and values in the upper tri-
angle can be considered violations of p-validity (this only refers
to MP and MT as there is no restriction for AC and DA). The
numbers in the upper left corner of each plot are the percent-
age of data points in the upper triangle (i.e., violations for MP
and MT). Inspection of the figure reveals that there are no vio-
lations of p-validity for the forward inference MP, but there are
20% violations for the backward inference MT. One interest-
ing finding emerges when looking at the two inferences that are
not restricted by p-validity: They mimic the pattern found for
MP and MT. For the other forward inference, DA, there are also
no responses in the upper triangle, whereas for the other back-
ward inference, AC, 17% of the responses are also in the upper
triangle.
The analysis so far did not take into account that the larger the
summed uncertainty of the premises, the larger the probability
that the response to the conditional inference is p-valid (i.e., in
the lower triangle) just by chance. In the extreme case of summed
uncertainties of 1 (e.g., if the probabilities of the premises are .5
each or lower) the probability of giving a p-valid response is also
1. In this case, participants cannot give a response that is not p-
valid, because every possible response is. When assuming that for
a chance response any value is equally likely (i.e., responses are
uniformly distributed across the response scale), one can con-
trol for this chance factor in the following way, as suggested by
Jonathan Evans and colleagues (Evans et al., 2014). We com-
puted a binary variable of whether or not a given response is
p-valid (coded with 1) or not (coded with 0) and compared it
with the sum of the uncertainties of the premises (truncated at
1), as this gives the probability of giving a p-valid response by
chance. If the difference of these two variables would be above 0,
the rate of responses being p-valid would be larger than expected
FIGURE 2 | Uncertainty of conclusion (x-axis) vs. summed
uncertainties of premises (y-axis) for the four conditional inferences.
Each data point shows a single response to one inference. For MP and
MT, p-validity is violated if data points fall in the upper triangle (i.e.,
uncertainty of the conclusion is larger than the uncertainty of the
premises). For AC and DA no such restriction exists. The numbers in the
upper left corner show the percentages of data points in the upper
triangle.
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by uniformly distributed random responses and thus it would
constitute evidence for above chance p-valid responses.
Therefore we estimated a LMM with this difference score as
dependent variable with inference (MP vs. MT) as fixed effects
and random intercepts for participants plus random intercepts
and random inference slopes for items. The analysis showed
that overall the intercept was significant, F(1, 10.48) = 8.39, p =
.02, indicating that there was evidence for above chance per-
formance. However, the effect of inference was also significant,
F(1, 28.98) = 8.41, p = 0.007, indicating that the inferences dif-
fered in their degree of over chance performance. In fact, post-
hoc analysis using the methods implemented in multcomp
(Bretz et al., 2011) revealed that only for MP was the esti-
mated effect of 0.26 reliably above zero, z = 4.21, p < 0.001.
In contrast, for MT, the effect was estimated to be virtually 0
(−0.004) and consequently not significant, z = −0.06, p = 0.52.
In this post-hoc analysis we used directional (i.e., one sided)
hypotheses and the Bonferroni-Holm correction to control for
alpha error cumulation.3 As some of the violations of p-validity
seemed to be rather mild violations (i.e., relatively near to the
diagonal of Figure 2), we repeated the reported analysis after
adding 0.05 and then again after adding another 0.05 (i.e., .1
in total) to the summed uncertainty of the conclusion to take
minor deviations into account. These two alternative analyses
3An alternative analysis comparing the observed rate of p-valid responses and
the chance rate of p-valid responses using either a paired t test or a paired
permutation test (i.e., stratified by participant) based on 100,000Monte Carlo
samples as implemented in packagecoin (Hothorn et al., 2006, 2008) yielded
the same pattern of significant and non–significant results. However, as this
analysis did not take potential effects of the conditionals into account (see
e.g., Judd et al., 2012) we prefer to report the LMM analysis.
yielded the exact same pattern of significant and non–significant
results.
Taken together, this analysis shows that for MP, partici-
pants give p-valid inferences. In contrast, for MT individuals do
not strictly draw p-valid conclusions, but sometimes are more
uncertain about the conclusions than implied by the premises.
Although some of those violations appear to be only mild viola-
tions (i.e., the problematic data points are near the diagonal) the
analysis that takes chance into account indicates that there is over-
all no evidence for p-validity above chance for MT. This differ-
ence between MP and MT resembles the well-known asymmetry
found in conditional reasoning with deductive instructions that
individuals are more likely to endorse MP than MT inferences
(e.g., Schroyens and Schaeken, 2003, Figure 4).
COHERENCE
In the next analysis we calculated coherence intervals based on
mental probability logic (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2005, 2010) for
each individual response using the probability estimates of the
premises. The intervals and the corresponding responses given
to the conditional inferences are displayed in Figure 3. From this
figure it is apparent that not all responses are coherent (i.e., fall
within the coherence interval), however, some of those violations
are very near the interval borders. Similar to p-validity, responses
can fall within the intervals predicted by mental probability logic
simply by chance (i.e., the larger the interval, the larger the chance
to give a response within the interval). Therefore, we first looked
at the correlations of the size of the interval with whether or not a
response is coherent, which are given in the header of each panel
in Figure 3. For MP there is clearly no such relationship. There is
slight evidence for this correlation for MT and a clear correlation
for both AC and DA.
FIGURE 3 | Individual coherence intervals as predicted by mental
probability logic and corresponding responses to the conditional
inferences. The intervals are depicted by black bars, responses inside
the interval are depicted as a white “◦,” responses outside the interval
are depicted as a black “◦.” Three cases in which the interval was only
of length 0.01 but the response inside the interval are marked with an
asterisk. The correlation depicted in the header of each panel is the
correlation of the size of each interval with whether or not a response
falls within the interval. Within each panel, the x-axis is ordered by
participant ID.
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Next, we performed an analysis similar to the one reported
for p-validity (again following Evans et al., 2014). For each par-
ticipant and response we calculated whether or not a response
falls within the interval or not (coded as 1 or 0, respectively) and
compared it with the size of the interval as the chance level to
give a response within the interval (again assuming that random
responses are uniformly distributed across the response scale).
These values (as percentages) are given in Table 3, which also
contains those percentages for intervals that are extended by 0.05
or 0.1 beyond the coherence intervals. To assess if observed rates
of coherent responses were larger than the chance rate of coher-
ent responses, we estimated a LMM with the difference between
both variables as dependent variable with inference (MP, MT, AC,
vs. DA) as fixed effect and random intercepts for participants
plus random intercepts and random inference slopes for items.
The analysis revealed a significant intercept, F(1, 16.07) = 7.37,
p = 0.02, indicating above chance performance, and a marginally
significant effect of inference, F(3, 9.26) = 2.88, p = 0.09. A post-
hoc analysis analogous to the one reported above revealed that
only MP showed a significant above chance performance of 0.40,
z = 4.14, p < 0.001. The only other effect that was not esti-
mated to be virtually 0 was DA with 0.14. However, this effect
did not reach significance, z = 1.61, p = 0.16 (this effect almost
reached significance, p = 0.053, when not controlling for alpha
error cumulation). The effects for MT and AC (−0.02 and 0.02,
respectively), did not differ from zero, z = −0.21, p = 0.82 and
z = 0.22, p = 0.82, respectively. When repeating this analysis
with the extended intervals the pattern of significant and non–
significant results stayed basically the same, with the only excep-
tion that for the extended intervals, the p-values for the effect of
DA dropped below 0.05 even when controlling for alpha error
cumulation.
Our analysis of the predictions of mental probability logic
reveals that, similar to p-validity, participants do not strictly
adhere to coherence. In fact, only for MP and to a lesser degree
for DA do we find above chance performance. In addition, it
should be noted that Table 3 shows that the distance of incoher-
ent responses from the border of the intervals is relatively large, at
least for MT and AC, indicating that these outside responses are
clear violations.
THE DUAL-SOURCE MODEL
Deductive conditional inference task
To fit the dual-source model to the data we combined estimates
from the probabilized conditional inference task which provided
the basis for the knowledge-based component of the dual-source
model (more below) with the deductive conditional inference
task which provided estimates for the form-based component of
the dual-source model. In the latter task, we expected partici-
pants to display a pattern of results that would be consistent with
what is usually found in experiments with deductive instructions
and basic conditionals (e.g., Evans, 1993): Almost unanimous
endorsement of MP, lower endorsement of MT, and still lower
endorsement of AC and DA, with the latter two not necessar-
ily differing. This expected pattern is essentially what we found,
as evident from Figure 4 and an LMM on the responses with
inference and conditional and their interaction as fixed effects
and random intercepts for participant plus random slopes for
inference and conditional. We only found a significant effect
of inference, F(3, 27) = 9.58, p < 0.001, other F < 1. Planned
comparisons using multcomp (Bretz et al., 2011) with direc-
tional hypotheses and no alpha-error correction revealed that
indeed, endorsement for MP was higher than for MT, z =
2.87, p = 0.002, and endorsement for MT tended to be higher
than endorsement for AC and DA, z = 1.36, p = 0.09, whereas
there were no differences between AC and DA, z = −0.38,
p = 0.65.
Specifying the model(s)
As already mentioned in the introduction, our method to esti-
mate the dual-source model diverged from the parametrization
used by Klauer et al. (2010). In particular, similar to Klauer
et al. we assumed that participants’ estimates of the probabil-
ity of the conclusion from their background knowledge should
follow from a coherent joint probability distribution over p, q
and their complements. But in contrast to the original formal-
ization which was based on Oaksford et al. (2000), we here follow
the formalization of mental probability logic (Pfeifer and Kleiter,
2005, 2010) in that we assume that the law of total probability
(as expressed in Equation 1 for MP) is the appropriate formula
to describe this component (the corresponding formulas for the
Table 3 | Percentage of coherent responses/coherent responses predicted by chance.
interval MP MT AC DA
+/− 0 87%/45% 63%/65% 60%/58% 60%/46%
(7%, 0.03; 7%, 0.12) (37%, 0.17) (40%, 0.18) (10%, 0.29; 30%, 0.10)
+/− 0.05 97%/54% 73%/69% 63%/62% 67%/54%
(0%, 0; 3%, 0.15) (27%, 0.22) (37%, 0.15) (10%, 0.24; 23%, 0.05)
+/− 0.1 97%/63% 73%/73% 73%/67% 83%/61%
(0%, 0; 3%, 0.10) (27%, 0.18) (27%, 0.12) (7%, 0.24; 10%, 0.04)
Percentages of responses within the coherence intervals/percentages of responses within the coherence intervals predicted from the size of the intervals. The
numbers in parentheses below each row are the percentages of responses below and above the interval (only below for MT and only above for AC) and the median
distance of the outside responses from the border of the interval. Rows 2, 3 present the same information but with intervals extended on both sides by 0.05 and
0.1, respectively.
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FIGURE 4 | Mean (filled symbols) and individual (non–filled symbols)
responses to the deductive conditional inference task. The two different
conditionals are depicted by different lines and symbols. A small amount of
vertical jitter was added to individual responses in case of perfect overlap to
make points distinguishable.
other inferences can be construed by elementary algebra4). Note
that Klauer et al.’s task and the presented probabilized conditional
inference task differ in that the minor premise was presented
as certain in the former case and as uncertain here. The differ-
ence to the coherence intervals proposed by Pfeifer and Kleiter
is that we use participants’ estimate of the probability of alter-
natives to the conditional, P(q|¬p), which they provided after
making the conditional inference, to obtain point estimates of the
knowledge-based component.
The baseline model (BL) we compare the dual-source model
against, only uses this point estimate and therefore has no free
parameters. This model reflects the idea the normative accounts
discussed in the introduction share that responses to conditional
inferences should come from a coherent probability distribution
over the elementary propositions in the inference. We use three
estimates from the participants to obtain a prediction for each
of the four responses to the conditional inferences: The two esti-
mates of the premises (identical to what is used for obtaining
the coherence intervals), which are obtained prior to making
the conditional inference, plus the estimate of the alternatives
4For MP we used Equation 1. For the other inferences we used the following
formulas:
MT: P(¬p) = 1 − P(q|p) − P(¬q)
P(q|¬p) − P(q|p)
AC: P(p) = P(q) − P(q|¬p)
P(q|p) − P(q|¬p)
DA: P(¬q) = 1 − P(¬p) × P(q|¬p) − P(q|p)(1 − P(¬p))
Values outside the probability scale (i.e., outside the interval from 0 to 1) were
set to the corresponding border.
to the conditional, P(q|¬p), which is obtained after making the
conditional inference.
For estimating the dual-source model (DS), we combined the
estimate of the baseline model as knowledge-based component
of the dual source model [i.e., ξ(C, x) in Equation 2] with esti-
mates for the form based component [i.e., τ (x) in Equation 2].
As estimates of the form-based components we used participants’
responses to the deductive conditional inference task (aggregating
across the two different conditionals). These two types of infor-
mation were integrated using the weighting parameter λ, which
we treated as a free parameter (constrained to vary between 0 and
1). In sum, we used four estimates from the participants to obtain
predictions for each of the four responses to the conditional infer-
ences (i.e., the three estimates used for the baseline model plus the
estimate for the corresponding inference from the deductive task)
plus one free parameter per participant.
As the dual-source model now necessarily has to provide
at least an as good account of the data as the baseline model
(although it uses additional data, the free parameter can only
increase the goodness of fit), we considered a variant of the base-
line model, denoted BL∗, which also included one free parameter
per participant. Specifically, we wanted to acknowledge the fact
that the estimate of alternatives to the conditional, P(q|¬p), was
obtained after making the conditional inference. It may well be
possible that participants show a bias due to memory or reevalua-
tion effects when giving their estimates of P(q|¬p). Hence, for BL∗
we estimated one free parameter per participants that was multi-
plied with all four estimates of P(q|¬p) for that participant and
could range between 0 and infinity, therefore acting as a scaling
parameter for all four P(q|¬p).
We fitted all three models (BL, DS, and BL∗) to the data of
individual participants (i.e., to the four responses given to the
four conditional inferences) using the estimates and parameters
described above and using root mean squared deviation (RMSD)
of predicted and observed values as criterion. For four data points
from four different participants we could not obtain a prediction
from the baseline model as a denominator in the formulas given
in Footnote 4 was 0. We excluded these four participants from the
following analysis.
Modeling results
The results from the different models as well as the original
responses are displayed in Figure 5, the corresponding mean
RMSDs are given in the lower right of the figure. To analyze the
results we estimated a LMMon the individual RMSDs withmodel
(baseline, dual-source, and BL∗) as fixed effect and random inter-
cepts for participants (random slopes for model could not be
estimated as our design contained no replicates, Barr, 2013). As
expected, we found a significant effect of model, F(2, 50) = 9.79,
p < 0.001. Post-hoc tests using Bonferroni-Holm correction for
multiple comparisons revealed that, trivially, the models with
a free parameter provided a better account than the baseline
model, z = −4.17, p = 0.003. However, there were no differences
between the dual-source model and the BL∗ model, z = 1.48,
p = 0.14.
According to the dual-source model, individuals integrate dif-
ferent types of information when making a conditional inference.
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FIGURE 5 | Mean (filled symbols) and individual (non–filled symbols)
model predictions and observed responses from the probabilized
conditional inference task. The solid line shows the observed responses
and the different dashed lines show the different models. A small amount of
vertical jitter was added to individual data points in case of perfect overlap to
make points distinguishable. The values in the lower right corner are the
mean root mean squared deviations (RMSD) of the different models vs. the
observed responses.
An analysis of the estimated λ parameters showed that 81% of the
participants used the form-based information (i.e., λ > 0), which
ranged for those participants from 0.02 to 0.70 with a mean of
0.31.
An analysis of the free parameter of the BL∗ model (i.e., the
scaling parameter for all P(q|¬p) per participant) indicated that
approximately half of the participants (54%) produced too large
estimates of P(q|¬p), as indicated by scaling parameters below 1.
The median scaling parameter was 0.95 (mean = 1.13, sd = 1.18).
For three individuals the scaling parameter was even virtually
0, indicating that they did not consider P(q|¬p) at all in their
responses to the conditional inferences. The maximal value of the
scaling parameter was 6.00.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goals of this manuscript were to test several central assump-
tions of what has been introduced as the “new paradigm psy-
chology of reasoning” (Over, 2009). The first question was how
individuals understand the conditional. Specifically, we provided
another test of the conditional probability hypothesis, address-
ing the question what predicts the probability of a conditional
“If p then q,” avoiding some limitations of previous assessments.
Our results could not be clearer. The data supports the condi-
tional probability hypothesis but none of the alternative expla-
nations. Only P(q|p) adds unique variance to the prediction of
P(if p then q). Interestingly, another hypothesis that is associated
with the new paradigm but can also be related to causal Bayes
nets (e.g., Fernbach and Erb, 2013; Rottman and Hastie, 2014),
the delta-p rule, receives essentially no empirical support. This
is especially surprising as Douven and Verbrugge (2012) found
an effect of a measure similar to delta-p when participants were
asked to estimate the acceptability instead of the probability of a
conditional. Furthermore, our results extend findings that there
is hardly any support for the hypothesis that the conjunction
P(p ∧ q) predicts the probability of everyday conditionals (e.g.,
Over et al., 2007; Douven and Verbrugge, 2013). It seems that this
latter hypothesis can only be confirmed for basic conditionals and
if participants are not used to the task (Fugard et al., 2011). All in
all this shows that for probabilistic tasks as employed here, the
Equation offers the only supported explanation as to how partici-
pants understand a conditional. If and how causal considerations
might also influence this understanding still needs to be shown.
The second main goal was to assess whether two norma-
tive accounts that have received special attention within the new
paradigm, Adams’ (1998) notion of p-validity and Pfeifer and
Kleiter’s (2005; 2010) mental probability logic, are empirically
adequate computational level theories (Marr, 1982) of reason-
ing. Specifically, we were interested in whether or not individuals’
responses are consistent with the norms proposed by the two
accounts. Unfortunately, not all of these results can be used as
evidence in favor of these accounts. For p-validity it seems that
most of the relevant responses (i.e., responses to MP and MT
inferences, as p-validity does not restrict responses to AC and DA)
are in fact given in accordance to the norm, for MP all responses
were even norm conforming. However, when taking the proba-
bility into account that responses could be p-valid by chance by
considering the smallest response value that would still be p-valid,
the analysis shows that only for MP there is above chance per-
formance. For MT, in contrast, performance was at chance level.
Similar results were obtained for the intervals predicted bymental
probability logic. When taking the size of the interval as chance
level into account, only for MP and, to a lesser degree, for DA
did participants responses follow the norm. In contrast, for MT
and AC only chance performance was observed. Therefore taken
together, only the results ofMP and of DA for the coherence based
approach can be viewed as evidence for the empirical adequacy of
p-validity and mental probability logic.
The probabilized conditional reasoning task, albeit allowing
us to run a simultaneous by-subject and by-item analysis on
directly obtained estimates of all relevant probabilities, contains
features which may have undesirable consequences. For exam-
ple, the eight questions for each conditional are administered in
www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 316 | 11
Singmann et al. Normative standards of conditional reasoning
one block, which may have led to anchoring or carry-over effects.
Additionally, the questions for P(If p then q), P(minor premise),
and P(conclusion) were always administered in this order and
all the other probabilities afterward which may have exacerbated
the above problem or induced order effects (this was one rea-
son for the free parameters in the BL∗ model). Future research
could try to rule our these concerns by for example alternating the
order or distributing the items per conditional across the exper-
imental session. Note that the sequence of items in the present
experiment was in part necessitated by the requirement to present
the probability estimates of the premises in the item asking for
the probability of the conclusion. Further, it was the sequence
least likely to cause undesirable transfer effects in the probabilized
conditional inferences which were of central interest here.
Some new paradigm researchers have argued that, by tak-
ing a Bayesian approach in the psychology of reasoning, we will
find quite a high level of rationality in people, as judged by
Bayesian standards (Oaksford and Chater, 2007, 2009). However,
other supporters of the new paradigm are doubtful that the new
approach will find a very high degree of rationality in people
(Evans and Over, 1996, 2013, and see Elqayam and Evans, 2011).
Studies in judgment and decision making have found numerous
fallacies and biases in people’s probability, and also utility, judg-
ments. In our view, it is excessively optimistic to expect these
irrational tendencies to disappear completely when people are
using their probability judgments, as they commonly do, in their
reasoning. From a dual process perspective, one could predict that
there will be an increased tendency for higher level processes to
be employed in explicit inferences. These higher processes could
increase conformity to normative rules, but do not always, or nec-
essarily, do so, whether the rules are probabilistic or not (Elqayam
and Over, 2012; Evans and Stanovich, 2013). We would predict
some increase in this conformity, but only expect people to be
modestly in line with p-validity and coherence in their reasoning
(an expectation also confirmed by Evans et al., 2014).
What we found in our experiment is that people were above
chance performance only for the MP inference. This finding
needs careful assessment and further study. It appears that peo-
ple are indeed limited to some extent in how far they conform to
Bayesian standards. However, we would point out that MP occu-
pies an absolutely central place in Bayesian inference. Take the
classic example of Bayesian inference in a scientific procedure.
We infer using Bayes’ theorem that there is a conditional prob-
ability that a certain hypothesis h holds given evidence e. Recent
research, cited above, has shown that people judge the probability
of a conditional, P(if e then h), to be the conditional probability,
P(h|e). Now the final stage of Bayesian inference is for e to be
found true or at least probable to some reasonable degree, so that
P(e) is high enough for some confidence in h, P(h), to be inferred.
The inference at this last step is usually called conditionalization
when P(h|e) is the major premise. We can see that it is an instance
of MP when the major premise is the conditional with a degree of
belief, P(if e then h) = P(h|e). Bayesian confirmation and belief
updating, or belief revision, depend on uses of MP of this general
form, when P(if e then h) = P(h|e) is invariant, or rigid, and P(e)
is found to be high (see Chater and Oaksford, 2009; Oaksford and
Chater, 2013). For this reason, it is significant that we have found
MP performance to be above chance level.
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